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INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1997, after ninety-nine years under British rule, the
Crown Colony of Hong Kong' became a Special Administrative Region under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China
("PRC") . Consider the following comments by Jeffrey A. Bader,
1. Hong Kong's former colonial status was the result of three agreements reached during
extensive negotiations which took place during the middle and late-nineteenth century between Britain and China. The last of these agreements resulted in Britain's lease of the territory known formerly as Hong Kong for a period of ninety-nine years, from 1898 to midnight on
June 30, 1997. See Convention of Respecting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory, June 9,
1898, China-Gr. Brit., 90 Brit. For. St. Pap. 17, 186 Consol. T.S. 310. For discussion and background relating to the nature of these negotiations and Hong Kong's peculiar history leading
to its reversion to the People's Republic of China (the "PRC"), see generally Shawn B. Jensen,
InternationalAgreements Between the United States and Hong Kong Under the United States-Hong Kong
Policy Act, 7 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 167, 167-71 (1993); Hungdah Chiu, Introduction: Hong
Kong, Transfer of Sovereignty, 20 CASEW. RES.J. INT'LL. 1 (1988);John H. Henderson, Note, The
Reintegrationof HongKong Into the People's Republic of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future
Prosperity, 28 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 506-15 (1995). As of February 1997, "(w]ith a land
area of only 420 miles and a population ofjust 6.3 million, Hong Kong has become the world's
eighth-largest trading economy and the leading international financial center." See Reversion of
Hong Kong to China: Hearings on Feb. 13, 1997, Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific of the
House Int'l Relations Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Jeffrey A. Bader, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs). At the end of 1996, Hong Kong recorded only 2.6%
unemployment, accumulated more than $63 billion dollars (U.S.) in foreign exchange reserves, and enjoyed one of the world's most liberal trade and investment regimes. See id. In
concert with the Heritage Foundation's rating of Hong Kong as the freest economy in the
world for the past three years, Hong Kong's citizens live in a framework of law and justice without economic, social, or political repression, benefiting from a well established rule of law
where freedom of expression is guaranteed. See id.
2. Article 31 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China confers on its main
legislative body, the National People's Congress, the authority to create a"Special Administrative Region" within the sovereignty of the PRC when it is deemed necessary or proper. See
XIANFA, art. 31, § 1 (1982). The Crown Colony of Hong Kong became the Hong Kong Special
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Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the
United States Department of State:
And what of the future? In the runup to reversion, a plethora of
views on Hong Kong's future abound. Some contend that Hong
Kong will be contaminated by a repressive system intolerant of dissent and any form of democratic government .... Others claim
that nothing will change, and that Hong Kong will continue as an
economic dynamo, a major center for business and finance, and an
entrepot and incentive for continued economic and political liberalization in China.3
Post-reversion media and scholarly debate continue to reflect these
opposing perceptions.
It is against this tumultuous legal, political, and economic backdrop that on May 16, 1997, after protracted U.S. legal proceedings,
4
acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbot certified the extraditability of
Hong Kong national Lui Kin-Hong for allegedly accepting nearly
four million dollars (U.S.) in bribes.5 Hong Kong's reversion to the
PRC on July 1, 1997, raises a number of complex legal issues regarding Lui's extradition 6 because the relationship between the United
Administrative Region ("HKSAR") upon China's resumption of sovereignty on July 1, 1997. See
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
Preamble, 29 I.L.M. 1520, 1520 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law] (establishing and identifying
Hong Kong's status in the post-reversion period as a Special Administrative Region).
3. See Winston Lord, Hong Kong's Progress Toward Reversion: Implications for the U.S., 7
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 378, 281 (1996) (statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Comittee, Washington, D.C.,July 18, 1996).
4. Extradition is "the surrender by one state (the requested state) to another (the requesting state) of an individual accused or convicted of an offense within the jurisdiction of the
requesting state. It requires the requesting state to be competent to try and punish the fugitive
and to be demanding his surrender for that purpose." Michael P. Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts
on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provisionof the Supplementary U.S.-U.K.
Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 257 n.2 (1988) (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15
WAYNE L. REv. 733, 733 (1969)). For a general treatment of the history, background, procedure and modern implications of international extradition, see generally M. Cherif Bassiouni,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974); I.A. Shearer, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971).
5. See In reExtradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D. Mass. 1996),petitionfor
habeas corpusgrantedsub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.),rev'd,
110 F.3d 103 (lst Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); see also infra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining use of habeas corpus writ as means of collaterally reviewing judicial order
certifying extraditability).
6. Within the scope of the Lui adjudication, these issues were first raised by Chief Judge
Tauro during Lui's initial bail proceedings, which preceded his actual extradition hearing. See
Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1189 (D. Mass.) (holding that reversion constituted "special circumstance," thereby justifying Lui's release on bail, and suggesting that legal questions presented by reversion within context of Lui's case would undoubtedly complicate and protract his United States legal proceedings), revg'913 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass.),rev'd, 83
F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996).
For the sake of clarity, the case that is the subject of this Note, or more specifically, the case
in which MagistrateJudge Karol certified Lui extraditable, In reExtraditionof Lui Kin-Hong, 939
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States and Hong Kong was governed by a treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom. The most compelling issue concerning Lui's domestic judicial proceedings is whether an individual
may be extradited when the requesting sovereign is not the sovereign
that will try, sentence, and punish the accused.8 The United States
has a well developed body of case law9 and an extensive statutory
scheme addressing the substantive and procedural law of international extradition.' ° In addition, Congress enacted legislation dealing
specifically with Hong Kong's reversion." Nevertheless, many of the
questions rising from Lui's rather unique situation remain unanswered.
This Note focuses on In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong,13 in which
the United States District Court for Massachusetts certified Lui extraditable to Hong Kong,' 4 despite the high probability that he would be
tried, sentenced, and punished under the sovereignty of a country"s
F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1996), will hereinafter be referred to in its short citation form asLui L
Chief Judge Tauro's decision on appeal, Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 1280 (D.
Mass. 1997), granting Lui's petition for habeas corpus will be short-cited as Lui II, and the decision of the First Circuit reversing the decision of Chief Judge Tauro, Lui Kin-Hong v. United
States, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997) will be short-cited as Lui III. Full citations to these three
cases will remain unchanged. Short citations to "Lui Kin-Hong" will refer to any in the line of
cases constituting Lui's bail proceedings.
7. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K.,
28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter Treaty]; Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland Signed at London on 8 June 1972, U.S.-U.K., T.IAS. No.
12050 (June 25, 1985) [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty].
8. See Lui , 939 F. Supp. at 1188 (examining difficult matters that United States courts
must address in determining Lui's extraditability); see also infranote 39 and accompanying text
(quotingJustice Breyer's summation of the issues presented by Lui).
9. See infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing extradition cases heard by Supreme Court, some dealing with issue of change in sovereignty of treaty partners, which is central theme in Lui 1).
10. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (explaining role of federal statutes in
United States extradition proceedings).
11. See United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, 106 Stat. 1448
(codified in part as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.);see also infra notes 110-26 and
accompanying text (discussing relevance of United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and
other sources of United States policy implicated in Lui's extradition proceedings).
12. See Lui Kin-Hong, 926 F. Supp. at 1188 (proffering that even if Lui does not prevail at
his extradition hearing, it is likely that issues of his case will prompt "circuit split," possibly causing United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari).
13. 939 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1996), petition for habeas corpus granted sub nom. Lui KinHong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied,
117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
14. See id. at 962 (finding nine charges out of ten sustainable by evidence, thereby rendering Lui extraditable under Treaty and Supplementary Treaty).
15. See Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Mass.) (discussing
"Hong Kong reversion timetable" and concluding that uncontroverted evidence establishes
that Hong Kong will be unable to try and punish Lui before reversion to China), reuld, 110 F.3d
103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 U.S. 1491 (1997).
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that at the time did not share an extradition treaty with the United
States."' Part I outlines the facts leading to Lui's arrest and summarizes his U.S. legal proceedings. Part II discusses the history of SinoBritish relations, and U.S. law and policy involving extradition to
Hong Kong. Part III comments on, and suggests alternatives to,
those portions of the Lui Kin-Hong decision that merit reconsideration in light of the unique and compelling facts surrounding Lui's
extradition.
I. FACrS
The events leading to Lui's extradition to Hong Kong span a number of years. From August 1988 to May 1993, Lui was employed by
the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of British American Tobacco Industries PLC ("BAT-PLC") .'
BAT-PLC manufactures and distributes to the world a number of
popular cigarette brands including Kent, Lucky Strike, and Viceroy.,
OnJanuary 1, 1992, while still employed by Brown & Williamson, Lui
assumed the position of Export Director for the British American
Tobacco Corporation in Hong Kong ("BAT-HK"), also a wholly
owned subsidiary of BAT-PLC. 9 At that time, BAT-HK maintained
exclusive rights to distribute cigarettes in a substantial number of
Asian countries, and Lui was alleged to be responsible for the allocation of cigarettes to selected Hong Kong trading companies. 21
The extradition request for Lui alleges that in conjunction with
other BAT-HK Executives, Lui exploited his title and position to solicit and receive bribes in excess of three million American dollars
from one trading company in particular, Giant Island, Limited
("GIL"), and certain GIL affiliates, namely, Wing Wah Company and
Pasto Company, Limited.2 ' Lui and his associates allegedly accepted
these bribes in return for granting GIL a monopoly over the export
of BAT-HK cigarettes.2
Although Lui admitted to having received the money, he contended that it was legitimate business income paid in consideration
for his assistance in establishing GIL's profitable business relation16. For a listing of countries with which the United States has entered into bilateral extradition treaties, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORcE (1997). This annual publication
lists treaties and other international agreements of the United States on record in the Department of State at the outset of each year.
17. See Lui I, 957 F. Supp. at 1282.
18. See Lui 1, 939 F. Supp. at 938.
19. See Lui 11, 957 F. Supp. at 1282.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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ships.23 In support of this contention, Lui relied on the undisputed
fact that GIL's first payment to him occurred well before he was in
any position to influence the allocation of BAT-HK cigarettes. 4
Hong Kong authorities maintained that the payments to Lui commenced as early as they did because Lui and GIL had the foresight to
anticipate Lui's eventual accession to an influential position within
BAT-HY 5
Following his departure from BAT-HK in May 1993, Lui pursued
his interests with the Subic International Cargo Center, Incorporated
("SICCI"), a company Lui began forming at some point prior to May
1993.6 SICCI, located in the Philippines, was involved in the warehousing and shipping of cigarettes. Lui owned approximately 35%
of SICCI stock, and until the time of his arrest, managed SICCI's day
28
to day operations. In the Spring of 1994, agents of Hong Kong's
Independent Commission Against Corruption ("ICAC") were invited
to meet Lui in the Philippines.2 Although the ICAC agents did travel
to the Philippines, the meeting, for some unknown reason, did not
occur.

30

Based on a tip from an informant, ICAC agents attempted to arrest
Lui on April 26, 1994, after investigating his business activities; Lui
was out of the country at the time.3 ' Hong Kong Magistrate Ian
Candy issued an arrest warrant for Lui on January 23, 1995; a second
arrest warrant with expanded charges was issued on December 12,
1995.2

On December 19, 1995, Lui flew from Manila, in the Phillipines, to
Boston to visit a hospitalized friend. 3 Hong Kong authorities learned
of the trip and solicited the assistance of U.S. authorities, eventually
leading to Lui's arrest on December 20, 1995, at Logan Airport.34
Lui's numerous court appearances in support of his request for release on bail proved unsuccessful;35 on August 29, 1996, Magistrate
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1282-83.
25. See In reExtradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 939 (D. Mass. 1996),peitionfor
habeascorpus grantedsub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.), rev'd,
110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
26. See Lui I, 957 F. Supp. 1283.
27. Seeid.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 913 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass.) (denying Lui's request for bail), rev'd, 926 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Judge Zachary R. Karol of the United States District Court of Massachusetts concluded that Lui was extraditable on nine of ten charges
against him ("Lui I").- Lui then filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Chief Judge Joseph L. Tauro granted his petition, concluding that Magistrate Judge Karol lacked jurisdiction to authorize Lui's
extradition ("Lui II") .3 The government of Hong Kong then filed
an appeal with the First Circuit that was well received; on'March 20,
1997, the First Circuit reversed Judge Tauro's decision granting Lui's
habeas petition, and on April 17, 1997, denied Lui's suggestion for a
rehearing en banc.' Concluding Lui's American legal proceedings,
on May 12, 1997, the Supreme Court denied Lui's petition for a stay
of mandate. Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbot signed Lui's extradition order on May 16, 1997, and Lui was returned to Hong Kong
shortly thereafter. 0 Lui's case was committed to the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region's Court of First Instance on July 9,
1997. 4' As of the date this writing was sent to the publisher, Lui was

36. See In reExtradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D. Mass. 1996),petitionfor
habeascorpus grantedsub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.), rev',
110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
37. Se. Lui II, 957 F. Supp. at 1280.
38. See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (lst Cir.),stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491
(1997). Circuit Judge Stahl filed a comprehensive dissent with the April 17, 1997, denial of
Lui's suggestion for a rehearing en banc, which follows the March 20, 1997, decision of the
First Circuit reversing ChiefJudge Tauro. Seeid. at 121.
39. See Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997). Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Stevens, filed a dissent that captured the essence of Lui's concerns:
The petition for certiorari that Lui intends to file would likely raise three questions. First, the treaty with the United Kingdom... grants the United Kingdom the
power to seek extradition of a fugitive offender. This Court has defined "extradition"
to mean "the surrender by one nation to another.., which being competent to try
and punish him, demands the surrender." Since Hong Kong will revert to the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997, and as the government admits, no trial could
be held before that date, does the United Kingdom have the "competence to try and
punish" Lui? And if not, can it now seek extradition?
Second, the Treaty provides that no person extradited shall "be extradited by
[the requesting Party] to a third State. Does this prohibit Lui's extradition?
Third, under the terms of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184 and 3186, does the Executive
Branch have the exclusive power to interpret these provisions of the treaty?
In essence, the petitioner says that the United States intends to extradite him,
not to the United Kingdom or to a crown colony of the United Kingdom, for trial, but
rather to the People's Republic of China. In my view, the papers accompanying this
motion for stay raise questions about the lawfulness of doing so, at least to the point
where I would issue the stay, pending a response from the Solicitor General. For that
reason I dissent from the Court's denial of the petitioner's application.
Id. at 1491 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
40. See Cliff Buddle & Niall Fraser, Extradition Case Victories a Boostfor FutureJustice SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, May 23, 1997, at 1, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
41. See Former Tobacco Firm Executive to Face Graft Trial Next Year, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 15, 1997, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File.
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in jail awaiting trial, which is scheduled to commence on March 16,
1998.42
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

One Country, Two Systems: A Planfor Hong Kong's Future

In order to successfully integrate Hong Kong's capitalist economy
and common law jurisprudence into the PRC's socialist, civil law
structure, the Chinese government adopted a policy towards Hong
Kong known as "one country, two systems." 3 The policy governs the
post-reversion relationship between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") and the Chinese government by granting
the HKSAR a high degree of executive, legislative, and judicial
autonomy, including a court of final adjudication.
The "one country, two systems" policy is at the core of the two most
significant documents responsible for the future of Hong Kong: the
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong45
('joint Declaration"), and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China46 ("Basic
Law"). The Joint Declaration is an international agreement through
which the United Kingdom and China share the obligation to ensure
the prosperity and future stability of the HKSAR. Its enactment followed years of negotiation, addressing such concerns as the HKSAR's
relationship with the Central People's Government, the role of the

42. See id.
43. Since the inception of the People's Republic of China in 1949, it has adhered to a socialist legal system with a single legal district. SeeJin Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, 'One
Countiy, Two Systems," Three Law Families, and FourLegal Regions: The Emerging Inter-RgionalConflicts of Law in China, 5 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 292-99 (1995) (explaining difficult conflict of laws issues facing China in reclaiming sovereignty over Hong Kong including China's
relationship with Macao and Taiwan). "One country, two systems" was put forth by Deng
Xiaoping to remedy the inherent incompatibility that China's legal system would undoubtedly
face upon the absorption of Hong Kong, a common law territory. See id.; see also infra notes 4458 and accompanying text (discussing incorporation of "one country, two systems" into legal
documents governing Hong Kong's reversion).
44. The Judiciary of the HKSAR should have a court of final appeal pursuant to the enactment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. See Hong Kong Court of Final
Appeal Ordinance, 35 I.L.M. 211 (1995).
45. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, P.R.C.-U.I(, 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter
Joint Declaration].
46. See Basic Law, supranote 2, at 1521.
47. The governments of the United Kingdom and China sought to secure this prosperity
in part through the formation of the "Sino-British Joint Liaison Group," whose main purpose
was to ensure the smooth transfer of government and implement the goals of the Joint Declaration. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 45, art. 4(5).
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United Kingdom in post-reversion Hong Kong, and most importantly, the future of Hong Kong's political, economic, judicial, and
social structure.48 The Basic Law, promulgated by the National People's Congress to serve primarily as the constitution for the HKSAR,
directly incorporated many of the drafting objectives of the Joint
Declaration." The drafting objectives of the Basic Law were twofold:
first, to ensure the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty, and
second, to preserve the prosperity that the territory had enjoyed under British rule.50
Although the PRC expressly pledged to honor the unprecedented
form of autonomy outlined in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law
for at least fifty years following the July 1, 1997, reversion, 5 "one
country, two systems" is not without its limitations. The Chinese government unequivocally maintains that the HKSAR is an "inalienable
part of the People's Republic of China, 52 and that the "Chief Executive of the [HKSAR] shall be accountable to the Central People's
Government. 53

The high degree of autonomy granted to the

HKSAR does not include jurisdiction over acts of state such as defense54 and foreign affairs. 5 These and similar provisions unquestionably articulate the limited and contingent nature of
56 the HKSAR's
independence from the Central People's Government.
The Joint Declaration and Basic Law also contain provisions directly addressing the scope of the HKSAR's international autonomy.
48.

Seeid.,art.3(3).

49.

See Basic Law, supra note 2, Preamble, at 1520 (endorsing doctrine of "one country,

two systems," and elaborating basic policy propositions that China accepted pursuant to its
commitment to uphold and abide byJoint Declaration).
50. See id. at 1511. The Basic Law attempts to balance the authority of the Chinese government against the ability of the HKSAR's to continue economic,judicial, political, and social
prosperity. Seeid.
51. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 45, art. 3(12) (promising that policy of the Chinese
government, which currently supports Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, "will remain
unchanged for 50 years"); Basic Law, supra note 2, ch. I, art. 5, at 1521 (incorporating Article
3(12) ofJoint Declaration verbatim).
52. Basic Law, supranote 2, ch. 1, art. 1, at 1521.
53. Id., ch. IV, § I, art. 43, at 1527; see alsoJoint Declaration, supranote 45, art. 3(2) (stating
that HKSAR will be "directly under the authority of the Central People's Government").
54. See Basic Law, supra note 2, ch. II, art. 13, at 1522 (explaining that central People's
Government will be responsible for Hong Kong's defense).
55. See id., ch. II, art. 14, at 1522 (noting that Central People's Government will be responsible for Hong Kong's foreign affairs).
56. In the United States, concern has often surfaced regarding China's sincerity to limit its
authority over Hong Kong to issues involving foreign affairs and defense in accordance with
Articles 13 and 14 of the Basic Law. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. H9116 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Dymally) (expressing concern over federal district court's decision to extradite individual to Hong Kong in light of reversion). Particularly compelling, Article 23 of the
Basic Law prohibits "foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the [HKSAR], and ...political organizations or bodies of the [HKSAR] from establishing ties with political organizations or bodies." Basic Law, supranote 2, ch. II, art. 23, at 1524.
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Both documents expressly permit the HKSAR to arrange for
"reciprocal juridical assistance" with foreign states upon approval
from the Central People's Government.' 7 Specifically, Article 153 of
the Basic Law maintains that international agreements formerly in
force in Hong Kong, to which China was not a party, may continue
with the assistance or authorization of the Central People's Government.58 If Lui had been delivered after July 1, 1997, pursuant to the
existing treaty with the United Kingdom or a new extradition treaty
applicable to the HKSAR, his extradition would have violated the Basic Law as well as U.S. law, which preclude extradition in the absence
of an enforceable treaty.9 Although Lui's actual delivery before July
1, 1997, sidestepped issues concerning the continuity of existing
Hong Kong law in the PRC, it raises compelling questions regarding
57. See Basic Law, supranote 2, ch. IV, § 4, art. 96, at 1535; Joint Declaration,supra note 45,
Annex I, art. III.
58. Article 153 provides:
The application to the [HKSAR] of international agreements to which the [PRC] is or
becomes a party shall be decided by the Central People's Government, in accordance
with the circumstances and needs of the Region, and after seeking the views of the
government of the Region.
International agreements to which the [PRC] is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong may continue to be implemented in the [HKSAR]. The Central People's Government shall, as necessary, authorize or assist the government of the
Region to make appropriate arrangements for the application to the Region of other
relevant international agreements.
Basic Law, supranote 2, ch. VII, art. 153, at 1544 (emphasis added). The use of the word"may"
rather than the word "shall" or its equivalent is significant: "shall" would have expressly conveyed the Chinese government's intention to keep all international agreements to which Hong
Kong is a member unconditionally in force, considering "shall" is used elsewhere in the article.
See id.The use of "shall" would have conferred on China a passive role, and Hong Kong's existing international agreements presumably would have continued without any guidance, approval, or endorsement from the Central People's Government as a matter of Chinese law and
policy. See id.As Article 153 reads now, however, any international agreement to which Hong
Kong is a member must be accompanied at a bare minimum by the endorsement of the Chinese government. See id. Absent any notion of acceptance, Article 153 suggests that an existing
Hong Kong agreement would not be binding on or necessarily accepted by the Central People's Government. See id.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994) (limiting applicability of United States Code sections concerning international extradition to those instances in which request for extradition has been
made by a foreign government pursuant to enforceable extradition treaty); see also Valentine v.
United States, 299 U.S. 5, 7-9 (1936) (holding that right of foreign power to demand extradition, and the correlative duty to surrender, exists only when created by treaty; no authority exists in any branch of government to surrender accused to foreign government absent treaty or
statute); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ("[A] government may... voluntarily exercise the power to surrender him a fugitive from justice... [but] the legal right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demanding country exist
only when created by treaty."); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-14 (1886)
(maintaining that extradition in absence of treaty rests on comity, not obligation); Quinn v.
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[N]o branch of the United States government
has any authority to surrender an accused to a foreign government except as provided for by
statute or treaty."); supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (explaining how extending the
extradition treaty applicable to Hong Kong, to which the PRC is not a party, contravenes Basic
Law).
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Lui's trial and punishment by a different sovereign than that which
requested his extradition. 6°
B. Impact of Treaty, Statutes and Case Law
In a United States extradition proceeding, treaties, statutes, and
case law each serve a distinct purpose. Treaties contain the legal obligations assumed by each country regarding the manner in which
the accused (sometimes referred to as the relator) is extradited, and
supply the underlying authority needed to comply with foreign requests." The process of U.S. extradition, including the role and duties of the Executive andJudiciary, is controlled by 18 U.S.C. §§ 31813196.62 Finally, the Judiciary has developed a substantial body of case
law (complying with its mandate under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 et seq. to interpret relevant treaties and statutes) in order to determine whether
extradition should take place.
Relevant treaty provisions
Extradition to Hong Kong has been governed since 1972 by the
Extradition Treaty ("Treaty") between the United States and the
United Kingdom." It was amended in 1986 by the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty ("Supplementary Treaty").65 Neither treaty makes
specific mention of Hong Kong's reversion to the PRC with respect
to suspension or termination of treaty obligations; however, they do
contain a number of provisions permitting the requested country to
deny an extradition request under certain circumstances.6 In con1.

60. See Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1203 (D. Mass.) (explaining that
even if Lui's extradition had occurred before the reversion date, it still would have presented
problems for United States authorities), rev'd, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996). It does not follow
logically that because the United Kingdom's sovereignty over Hong Kong expires at a certain
date and time, the accompanying treaty rights must expire at that date and time as well. See id.
Lui's trial, presently scheduled for March 1998, and subsequent sentencing and punishment
exemplifies this point.
61. See Factor, 290 U.S. at 287-94 (stating existence of enforceable treaty is required to
honor foreign demands for extradition, and explaining manner in which international extradition treaties should be construed); see also supranote 59 and accompanying text (enumerating
cases that allowed extradition only in accordance with enforceable treaty).
62. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196. These sections of the United States Code exclusively addresses
the topic of extradition. They also contain provisions for domestic extradition, which is not
within the scope of this Note. See id. § 3182 (explaining domestic interstate extradition process).
63. See infra notes 87-109, 179 and accompanying text (presenting cases and judicial doctrine affecting Lui Kin-Hong's extradition, including impact of federal statutes and treaties).
64. SeeTreaty, supranote 7.
65. SeeSupplementary Treaty, supranote 7.
66. See infra notes 70-80, 179 and accompanying text (explaining manner in which Article
IV and Article XII of Treaty, and Article 3(a) of Supplementary Treaty, place conditions for
delivery upon requesting country).
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cert with these provisions, which typically invoke judicial interpretation, the Treaty's introductory statement expresses the signatories'
desire to facilitate "the reciprocal extradition of offenders., 67 Thus, if
either the United States or the United Kingdom determine that the
other has not adequately honored the principle of reciprocal extradition, the Treaty provides each party the power to terminate the
Treaty six months after written notice. This power of termination is
unconditional;6 in the United States, it resides exclusively with the
Secretary of State. 69
a.

The Article XII specialty provision

Article XII of the Treaty, often referred to as the "specialty" provision, confers upon the relator certain protections, or "specialty
rights." Article XII contains two substantial provision. 70 First, it prohibits the requesting party from re-extraditing the relator to a third
state. " This would prevent Hong Kong from surrendering Lui to
PRC authorities, or any other state, after the United States honored
its extradition request.7 Second, it prohibits the requesting country
'from proceeding against the extradited individual for any offense
other than the offense for which the extradition request was made,

67. Treaty, supra note 7, Introduction, art. 11(2). The Supplementary Treaty in Article 7
allows for its termination "in the same manner as the Treaty." Supplementary Treaty, supra
note 7, art. 7.
68. See Treaty, supra note 7, art. 11(2) (lacking any conditions on exercise of termination
power); Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 7.
69. See In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 960 (D. Mass. 1996) (declaring
Secretary of State's unlimited power to extradite or deny extradition, and to terminate treaties), petitionfor habeas corpus granted sub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280
(D. Mass.), rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997); see also infra notes
80-86 and accompanying text (explaining procedures of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184 and 3186, under
which the Secretary of State "may" order delivery of person to requesting country).
70. See Treaty, supranote 7, art. XII. Article XII provides as follows:
(1) A person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against in the territory of
the requesting Party for any offense other than an extraditable offense established by
the facts in respect of which his extradition has been granted, or on account of any
other matters, nor be extradited by that Party to a third State(a) until after he has returned to the territory of the request party; or
(b) until the expiration of thirty days after he has been free to return to the territory of the requested Party.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article shall not apply to offenses committed, or matter arising, after the extradition.
Id. Lui incorporated both aspects of this provision into his argument against his extradition.
See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 956.
71. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. XII.
72. See id. art. XII(1). This is what Lui claimed would happen if extradited. He argued
that the reversion, while not constituting an "automatic violation of specialty," imposed proceedings against him under three different sovereigns: the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the PRC. See Lui 1,939 F. Supp. at 956-57.
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not including post-extradition matters. 5 In practice, this prevents the
requesting country from amending or increasing the severity of
charges against a relator, once extradited. 7
b. The Article IV capitaloffense exception
Article IV of the Treaty allows the requested party to deny extradition if: (1) the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the law of the requesting party, and (2) the
death penalty is not available for the corresponding offense under
the law of the requested country.7 5 Under PRC law, a state official
convicted of bribery, as well as a number of non violent economic
crimes, is punishable by death 6 For Lui, determining the meaning
of "the relevant law of the requesting party"77 is of critical consequence. Considering that Lui's trial, sentencing and punishment will
occur after July 1, 1997, "the relevant law" implicates not only the
former law of Hong Kong and Great Britain, but also the present law
of the HKSAR and the law of the PRC.7 8 Furthermore, the identity of
"the requesting party"-the United Kingdom, the HKSAR, or the
PRC-remains entirely unclear." With these considerations in mind,
73. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. XI.
74. See id. It is this part of Article XII that captures accurately Lui's prevailing concerns
regarding his specialty rights; fears that China may impose additional charges, or sentence him
in accordance with Chinese law. See Lui , 939 F. Supp. at 957. Although the Basic Law expressly states that China will permit the judicial system practiced previously in Hong Kong to be
maintained in the HKSAR, the Basic Law is strictly an internal document and it has no binding
effect on any other nation. SeeBasic Law, supranote 2, ch. IV, § 4, arts. 80-81, 84-87, at 1533.
75. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. IV. Article IV of the Treaty provides:
If the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death under the
relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the requested Party does
not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may be refused unless
the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party that the death
penalty will not be carried out.
Id.
76. See Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, ch. VII, art. 185 (1979), translated
in LEXIS, INTLAW Library, CHINAL File, amended by Decision of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress Regarding the Severe Punishment of Criminals who Sabotage
the Economy, art. (A), §§ 1-2 (1982) [hereinafter Severe Punishment Decision], translated in
LEXIS, INTLAW Library, CHINAL File. The relevant provision provides that "[a~ny state functionary who extorts or accepts bribes shall be punished ....
[W]hen the circumstances are
especially serious, he shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or death." Id.
77. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. IV.
78. See id. As Lui will be punished in the HKSAR under the sovereignty of the PRC, U.S.
judicial interpretation of the "relevant law" within Article IV of the Treaty must have depended
in part on the court's confidence in the PRC's commitment to allow existing law in Hong Kong
to remain unchanged in accordance with the Basic Law. Notwithstanding its certification of
extraditability, the court in Lui I intimated that Lui's concerns under Article IV of the Treaty
were not without merit. See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 962 (acknowledging that court's certification
of Lui's extraditability did not indicate that Lui's claims are unimportant, but concluding that
they should be addressed by the Secretary of State).
79. See Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV. For the same reasons that the "relevant law" under
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the Article IV-based arguments that Lui advanced against extradition
appear far more powerful than the court in Lui I intimated upon its
certification of his extraditability.
2. Federalstatutes controllingthe extraditionprocess
In the United States, international extradition occurs through a bifurcated proceeding set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3184.80 Upon receipt of
a foreign government's extradition request, a federal magistrate or
judge determines whether the offense is extraditable under the applicable treaty.$' If the court determines that extradition is warranted, the Secretary of State can uphold or reject the court's certification of extraditability.82 The Secretary of State cannot, however,
authorize extradition in the event that a court finds the offense nonextraditable. 3
Certain provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 continue to suffer from
broad and inconsistent interpretations in the courts.84 The Judiciary
has held that the power of the Secretary of State ranges from mere
power of certification over evidence and testimony, in order to forward a complete record to the requesting country, to final discretion
over the extradition decision itself.85 As a result, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 has
which Lui will be tried could be the Criminal Law of the PRC and the Severe Punishment Decision, the "requesting party" could have been construed constructively as the HKSAR or China.
See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 957 n.22 (identifying current Chinese laws that permit death penalty as
reasoning and basis underlying Lui's Article IV argument).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994). Section 3184 provides, in relevant part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and a foreign government any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate... may... issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged, that
he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.... If, on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same... to the Secretary of State, that a warrant
may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government,
for the surrender of such person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention ....

Id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Scharf, supranote 4, at 260 (explaining that Secretary of State may decline to honor
judicial order in response to foreign request for extradition, but may not order extradition of a
relator if court denies a foreign extradition request).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 clarifies the role of the Secretary of State pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3184: "[t]he Secretary of State may order the person committed under sections 3184... to be
delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government, to be tried for the offense of
which charged." 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (emphasis added). The discretionary authority granted the
Secretary of State through both statutes' use of the word"may" has been the topic of much legal discussion. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (presenting and discussing cases
interpreting 18 U.S.C §§ 3184 and 3186).
85. Compare Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 960 (stating that "the Secretary of State has complete
discretion to extradite or not"), and Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105-1106 (5th
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engendered extensive litigation regarding the proper role of each
branch, even eliciting a constitutional challenge grounded on a separation of powers theory."
Case law involved in Lu's reversion defense
The political and social uncertainty surrounding Hong Kong's future have yielded only a small number of extradition cases in which
the reversion was raised as a defense. The court in Lui I cited only
three cases in this respect: In re Extradition of Tang Yee-Chun, 7 en
8 9 Although the
Yin-Choy v. Robinson,** and Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston.
court in Lui I identified these cases as directly on point, there are
significant factual differences between these precedents and Lui's
caseY" Notwithstanding these differences, a brief exposition of each
3.

Cir. 1980) ("Assuming that the magistrate's decision is in favor of extradition, the Executive's
discretionary determination is not generally subject to judicial review. The ultimate decision to
extradite is a matter within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive in the exercise of its
power to conduct foreign affairs."), with In reExtradition of Sutton, 905 F. Supp. 631, 636 (E.D.
Mo. 1995) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 does not "on its face" confer power to Secretary of
State to conduct independent review of extraditing judge's findings), and Carreno v. Johnson,
899 F. Supp. 624, 633 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 does not confer impermissible power of review upon Secretary of State by requiring judge to certify evidence and testimony; rather, statutory requirement serves purpose of compiling complete record for purpose of forwarding it to requesting country).
86. See LoBue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 72-76 (D.D.C. 1995), vacatedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court held in pertinent part:
The Executive branch is under no obligation whatever to offer specific reasons for decisions [that] are committed to its sole discretion, and no court could ever compel the
Secretary of State to explain his decision not to accede to an extradition request [that]
the courts have found to be lawful. At the same time, however, no statute may confer-and the Executive may not purport to wield-the power to review and set aside
determinations which are constitutionally committed to the Judicial branch. Under
the present extradition scheme, the legality of performing a given extradition is such
a determination. If, based upon its consideration of political and foreign policy issues
that are committed to its discretion, the Executive branch chooses not to honor a particular extradition request, that is its prerogative. The Executive may not, however,
perform-and purport to rely upon-its own independent analysis of the extradition
judge's legal conclusions. To do so is to subject the legal determinations of the Judiciary to Executive Branch review, which is unconstitutional.
Id. at 73-74. Courts addressing the issue since LoBue have held to the contrary. See, e.g., Lui I,
939 F. Supp. at 941 n.5 (finding decisions in Marzook, Lin and Sutton persuasive and rejecting
alleged unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3184);In re Extradition of Marzook, 924 F. Supp. 565,
570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting the LoBue separation of powers analysis because extradition,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, is Executive Branch function, not Article III function ofJudiciary;
therefore, by definition, the Executive is not "impermissibly encroach [ing] or aggrandiz[ing]"
power from the Judiciary); In re Extradition of Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206, 211-15 (D. Guam 1995)
(declining to follow LoBue because the decision was not binding in present case); Sutton, 905 F.
Supp. at 636-37 (holding that separation of powers is not violated because extradition is primary function of Executive Branch as part of "Executive's power to conduct foreign affairs and
consider factors that may affect foreign policy and relations").
87. 674 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
88. 858 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. 734 F. Supp. 988 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
90. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text (addressing Lui's attempt to distinguish
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case's findings within the context of the Treaty will prove helpful in
later analysis.
a. Interpretationof the Article XII specialty provision
Each of these three cases addressed a claim raising specialty fights
under Article XII of the Treaty. In Tang Yee-Chun, the petitione' argued that she was not being extradited to Hong Kong, but rather that
the broader effects of the reversion constituted a de facto extradition
to China.9 2 She argued further that she might be tried for additional
offenses for which she was not extradited. 9 Although Tang Yee-Chun
did not address the issue of incarceration beyond July 1, 1997, as an
element of the petitioner's specialty claim, the petitioners in Oen YinChoy and Cheng Na-Yuet distinguished and refined their specialty argument by asserting that, if extradited, their probable incarceration
beyond the reversion would constitute a direct violation of Article
XII. 94 The court in Tang Yee-Chun held simply that the proper scope
of judicial inquiry precluded the petitioner from raising the argument based on Article XII specialty rights, claiming that such considerations could be heard only by the Secretary of State.95 In significant
cases despite court's strong reliance upon them).
91. Regarding extradition proceedings in the United States, it is well established that a
petition for writ of habeas corpus is the only avenue for review of a magistrate judge's order
certifying extradition; the scope of review is available "only to inquire whether the magistrate
had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and ... whether there was any
evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused
guilty." Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540, 542-43 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips,
268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)). The Ninth Circuit clarified the Supreme Court's language regarding the proper scope of collateral review by habeas corpus in an international extradition proceeding, setting forth a five-part test in Caplanv. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336, 1340 (1981):
(T]he court is not permitted to inquire beyond whether (1) the extradition judge had
jurisdiction to conduct extradition proceedings; (2) the extradition court had jurisdiction over the fugitive; (3) the treaty of extradition was in full force and effect;
(4) the crime fell within the terms of the treaty; and (5) there was competent legal
evidence to support a finding of extraditability.
Id.
92. See Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. at 1068 (presenting Tang Yee-Chun's argument that
.she will effectively be extradited not to Hong Kong but to the People's Republic, in violation
of Article XII of the Treaty").
93. See id. (stating Tang's argument that "she might be subject to prosecution for offenses
for which she was not extradited").
94. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1403 (stating Oen's argument that"if he is extradited and
convicted, he may remain incarcerated in Hong Kong beyond July 1, 1997.... He will in effect
have been extradited to China"); Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 992 (reciting Cheng's argument that "if Petitioner were to remain incarcerated at the time of the Reversion, then she argues that she will, in effect, have been extradited to a third state, in violation of Article XII").
95. See Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. at 1068. In this case, Petitioner did not develop her
specialty argument beyond the simple claim that the reversion, on its face, violated Article XII
of the Treaty. See id. The court formulated the petitioner's argument simply as "[petitioner
would] effectively be extradited not to Hong Kong but to the People's Republic, in violation of
Article XII." Id.
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contrast, the courts in Oen Yin-Choy and ChengNa-Yuet declined to defer the specialty issue to the Secretary of State; they upheld the petitioners' extraditability on the merits.9 Adopting a rather formalistic
style of reasoning, the courts in Oen Yin-Choy and Cheng Na-Yuet focused on the express language defining the term 'extradition' set
forth in Terlinden v. Ames. 7 Terlinden defines extradition as "the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of another, which, being competent to try and to
punish him, demands the surrender."98 The courts reasoned that incarceration should not be considered in their analysis of an extradition demand because the definition mentions only the act of the relator's actual 'surrender,' implicating nothing thereafter, such as trial
or punishment." Therefore, even if the petitioners, following their
delivery to Hong Kong authorities became subject to Chinese control, the United States would not have extradited the petitioners to
the PRC.'"
Oen Yin-Choy and Cheng Na-Yuet afford considerable attention
to the second specialty argument raised by the petitioners, namely,
that they would be subject to trial for additional offenses for which
they were not extradited. Relying on Tang Yee-Chun, the court in
ChengNa-Yuet held that the Treaty constitutes commitments between
96. Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 993.
97. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
98. Id. at 289. Terlinden further refines this definition by stating that"neither deportation
nor surrender other than in response to a demand pursuant to a Treaty constitutes extradition." Id.
99. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1403-04; Cheng Na-Yurt, 734 F. Supp. at 992-93. It appears
that both courts employed a temporally guided, or, strictly "chronological" interpretation of
the definition of extradition presented in Terlinden. See Oen Yin.Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; Cheng
Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 992. Thus, the courts reasoned that because surrender by the requested state must undoubtedly occur before incarceration by the requesting state in any international extradition proceeding, the requested state has fully and completely extradited the
individual upon surrender in accordance with Terlinden; whatever may be in store for the relator following surrender can only occur after the requested nation has already completed its extradition. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1403-04; ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 992-93. This approach fails to acknowledge that in the United States, the requesting nation's competency to
try and punish the relator, also mentioned in the Terlindendefinition, must be approved by two
thirds of the Senate before any foreign request for extradition can be honored. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
100. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; Cheng Na-Yue, 734 F. Supp. at 992. The circularity
in the courts' reasoning cannot be overlooked. The petitioners argued that they were essentially being extradited to the PRC. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F.
Supp. at 992. The argument realized that because the United States did not have an extradition treaty with the PRC, such an extradition would have violated U.S. law. The courts responded that it was not possible for the United States to extradite the petitioners to China, for
if the United States has no extradition treaty, the petitioners could not possibly be extradited to
China under United States law. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F. Supp.
at 992.
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the United States and the United Kingdom, and "does not purport to
include commitments by successor governments or third states"
0 1 The
against imposing additional charges or harsher punishments.Y
court in Oen Yin-Choy clarified this reasoning, stating that "[w] ere the
Treaty to be interpreted as Oen asks, extradition to Hong Kong
would be the exception rather than the rule because it would be limited in practice only to extradition for crimes which could be punished for a term expiring before the reversion date. ' '
b. Interpretationof the Article IV capital offense exception
Only in Tang Yee-Chun and ChengNa-Yuet did the petitioners mount
a defense against extradition based on the Article IV capital offense
exception of the Treaty. 0 3 In Tang Yee-Chun, the petitioners attempted to reinforce the validity of their Article IV argument by
submitting an expert's affidavit claiming that "[the] possibility of
eventual capital punishment awaits the relators if extradited.', 0 4 In
rejecting the petitioners' argument, the court reasoned that, as with
petitioners' specialty provision allegations, such "humanitarian" arguments were beyond the scope ofjudicial inquiry.' s The court concluded that if such concerns had any validity, proper appeal should
be made to the Executive and not the Judiciary Branch.'O
The court in Cheng Na-Yuet held similarly that the scope of its inquiry precluded a holding favorable to the petitioner based on Arti101. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404. In Tang Yee-Chun, the court deferred to the Secretary of State all issues regarding the petitioner's arguments related to the reversion. See In re
Extradition of Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). It indicated that the
petitioner's concerns were "too remote and too speculative tojustify any action by this Court."
Id. It was this same reasoning that the courts in Oen Yin-Choy and ChengNa-Yuel used to dismiss
the petitioners' claims on the merits. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F.
Supp. at 993.
102. Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1404; see also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text
(raising possible weaknesses of the courts' reasoning).
103. See Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 992; Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. at 1068. It is not
entirely clear why the petitioner in Oen Yin-Choy did not raise Article IV as a defense. Arguments based on the exception to extradition in Article IV in Tang Yee-Chun and Cheng Na-Yuet
did not require that their crimes be punishable by death under current Chinese law, but
rather, that they might be subject to the death penalty if the PRC changed its own laws
.retroactively" to include the death penalty for their crimes. See id. at 1068.
104. Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. at 1068.
105. See id. The court consolidated each of the petitioners' concerns raised under Articles
XII and IV of the Treaty into a single argument, from which the court posed the question of
whether "these possibilities, remote as they are, should so shock this Court's sense of decency
that it should not grant extradition." Id. Before holding that the judicial determination regarding that question was precluded by the Executive's exclusive right to grant or deny extradition on humanitarian grounds, the court dismissed the issue as too speculative and too remote
tojustify judicial action. See id.; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing similar reasoning in ChengNa-Yuel and Oen Yin-Choy).
106. See Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp. at 1068.
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cle IV.1' 7 Clarifying the manner in which Article IV operates, the
court explained that Article IV cannot not bar a court from certifying
or upholding a request for extradition, because it "merely provides a
discretionary basis for denial of extradition by the [requested] government."'' 8 Despite this reasoning, the court conducted an extensive analysis into the merits of the petitioner's claim, conceding eventually that it was "moved by Petitioner's fears of capital
punishment. ' °"
C. United States Policy on Hong Kong and the FutureHKSAR
The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 ("Policy Act")" 0 is
the most prominent statement of U.S. policy concerning Hong
Kong's transfer of sovereignty. It fully endorses the implementation
of the Joint Declaration.. and formally recognizes the "continued vitality, prosperity and stability of Hong Kong" as a critical interest to
the United States." 2 It likewise establishes that the United States
should play an active role before and after reversion to protect its existing ties with Hong Kong."
The Policy Act also provides a distinctive statement concerning the
continued application of United States law in the HKSAR, including

107. Sev ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 993-94.
108. Id. at 994. Article IV of the Treaty allows the requesting country to exercise its discretion in refusing extradition if the death penalty can be imposed against the petitioner in the
requesting state for a crime not punishable by death in the requested state. See Treaty, supra
note 6, art. IV. The court in Cheng Na-Yuet acknowledged this by correctly stating that a simple
discrepancy in capital sentencing between the requested and requesting country would not bar
an extradition outright. See ChengNa-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 994. Under the circumstances present in ChengNa-Yuet, Oen Yin-Choy, Tang Yee-Chun, and Lui Kin-Hong, however, the ability of the
requested country to obtain assurances from the requesting state is severely hindered. See infra
notes 163-77 and accompanying text (discussing the significant impact of Hong Kong's reversion on U.S. ability to protect Lui from capital punishment if tried in the HKSAR).
109. Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 994. Arguably, a court conducting such an analysis
would appear ambivalent as to whether the Judicial or Executive Branch should render the determination of extraditability with respect to a relator's Article IV concerns. See supranotes 8485 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting sources of law regarding the role of the
Executive andJudiciary in an extradition proceeding).
110. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, 106 Stat. 1448
(codified in part in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
111. Seeid.§2(l).
112. See id. § 2(4). Specifically, this section states that the United States is interested in
maintaining Hong Kong's "important role in today's regional and world economy, which is
reflected in its
strong economic, cultural, and other ties with the United States." Id. Section 5
further states that "[s]upport for democratization is a fundamental principle of United States
foreign policy"; inasmuch as this policy has applied to Hong Kong previously, "[it] will con-

tinue to remain true afterjune 30, 1997." Id. § 2(5).
113. Section 101(1) states in full, "[t]he United States should play an active role, before, on,
and after July 1, 1997, in maintaining Hong Kong's confidence and prosperity, Hong Kong's
role as an international financial center, and the mutually beneficial ties between the people of
the United States and the people ofHong Kong. Id. § 101(1).
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the following excerpt from section 201 (a):
Notwithstanding any change in the exercise of sovereignty over

Hong Kong, the laws of the United States shall continue to apply
with respect to Hong Kong on and after July 1, 1997, in the same
manner as the laws of the United States were applied with respect
to Hong Kong before such date unless otherwise expressly provided
by law or by Executive order .... 14
Section 201 (b) elaborates further that this policy shall be directly
applicable to United States courts. 5 Thus, unless the Policy Act is
repealed or amended in accordance with law, a court required to determine whether a treaty extends beyond the reversion date cannot
consider the reversion as a factor." 6 Further, the Act is highly suggestive of Congress' intent that existing treaties applicable to Hong
Kong, including those treaties involving extradition, should remain
enforceable." 7 The Policy Act does not, however, usurp the Judiciary's power to interpret provisions of a treaty and render determinations as provided by law." 8 Within an extradition proceeding, this
means that courts may continue to take into account considerations
such as specialty rights afforded the relator," 9 the capital offense exception, 20 and, ultimately, whether2 an enforceable treaty exists be'
tween the parties as a matter of law.'
114. Id.§201(a).
115. See id. § 201(b). Section 201(b) provides:
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force on and afterJuly 1, 1997, of all treaties and other international agreements ... entered into before such date between the United States
and Hong Kong, or entered into before such date between the United States and the
United Kingdom and applied to Hong Kong, unless or until terminated in accordance
with law. If... the President determines that Hong Kong is not legally competent to
carry out its obligations.., or that the continuation of Hong Kong's obligations or
rights under any such treaty or other international agreement is not appropriate under the circumstances, such determination shall be reported to the Congress ....
Id. At the time the decision in Lui Iwas rendered, the President had yet to make any report to
Congress regarding the propriety of continuing Hong Kong's rights under the Treaty. See In re
Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 961 (D. Mass. 1996), petition for habeas corpus
granted sub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.),rev'd, 110 F.3d 103
(1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
116. But see Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 961 (stating that legal effect of section 201(b) of United
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 is debatable).
117. See id. (claiming that section 201(b) of the Policy Act clearly expresses Congress' intention that the Treaty remain in effect indefinitely beyond reversion, unless otherwise terminated
by Executive).
118. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, a judge may extradite if "he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain a charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention .... " 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
119. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. XII.
120. See id. art. IV.
121. These analyses are typical to extradition proceedings. See generally Oen Yin-Choy v.
Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing whether extradition treaty purports to include commitment by successor governments or third states); Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at
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The tenor of the Policy Act suggests that the United States is confident that the PRC will honor the provisions of the Joint Declaration
and Basic Law protecting the HKSAR's autonomy.'
In fact, this is
the reasoning adopted by the court in Lui I as the basis for determining that the Treaty should remain in force and applicable to the
HKSAR. 23 Other sources of policy emanating from the U.S. government suggest, however, that this confidence is not widespread. The
Congressional Record is replete with instances of U.S. leaders voicing
concern over the PRC's sincerity in honoring HKSAR autonomy.124
The State Department's Country Reportsfor Human Rights Practicescatalogued continuing and serious human rights violations in China in
19 9 6 .'2 Even within the proceedings against Lui, at least one court
958; Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 992-94 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (discussing extradition treaty's enforceability where possibility of capital punishment existed because of Hong
Kong's impending reversion to the PRC); In re Extradition of Tang Yee-Chun, 674 F. Supp.
1058, 1068-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Tang Yee-Chun concluded with an enumerated list of findings,
which included "a valid treaty exists"; "the crimes ... are provided for by [the] Treaty"; the relators "are the persons sought to be extradited"; the relators "were found within the Court's
jurisdiction," and finally, "[t]here is probable cause to believe that [the relators) committed the
crimes with which they have been charged by Hong Kong authorities." Id. at 1070.
122. By stating that "the laws of the United States shall continue to apply with respect to
Hong Kong in the same manner, on and afterJuly 1, 1997," Congress made an implicit vote of
confidence that the PRC will not significantly alter the existing legal structure. See United
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, § 201(a), 106 Star. 1448, 1452
(codified in part in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.);see also supra note 115 and accompanying
text (citing section 201 (b) of United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992).
123. See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 960 (discussing reasons why extradition of Lui Kin-Hong
would not thwart the will of Executive and legislative branches).
124. Sew 138 CONG. REC. H9116 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) (statement of Rep. Dymally).
Speaking on behalf of Chan Hueng-Kong, a U.S. citizen upon whom Hong Kong issued an extradition request, Representative Dymally stated:
If Mr. Chan is extradited, his criminal case will likely still be pending in court when
the Hong Kongjudicial system reverts to the control of the Chinese Government ....
If Mr. Chan's trial is completed and his case is on appeal when the Communist government assumes control, he will face the real danger of having his case reviewed by a
Judiciary that is isolated from and indeed antagonistic toward the Western legal tradition .... Even if Mr. Chan were exonerated of the charges against him, arising under
present Hong Kong law, he faces the danger of being subject to prosecution in the
People's Republic of China on new charges... Although Hong Kong has a treaty obligation to the United States not to charge Mr. Chan with any offense beyond that set
out in the extradition request, China has no similar duty because it is not a signatory
to any extradition treaty with the United States. Thus, the People's Republic of China
is free to prosecute Mr. Chan as it sees fit.
Id.
125. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAcTIcES FOR 1996
(1997).
The Chinese Government continued to commit widespread and well-documented
human rights abuses, in violation of internationally accepted norms, stemming from
the authorities' intolerance of dissent, fear of unrest, and the absence or inadequacy
of laws protecting basic freedoms. The Constitution and laws provide for fundamental mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, and arbitrary and lengthy incommunicado detention. Prison conditions remained harsh. The Government continued
severe restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, religion,
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noted in dicta that Lui's arguments concerning potentially harsh
punishment under Chinese sovereignty are well-founded. 6
Judicial interpretation of United States policy regarding the reversion, and particularly its impact on Lui's defenses against extradition,
is tremendously significant. It is implicated in the analysis of specialty
rights, the capital offense exception, the questionable existence of an
enforceable treaty, and ultimately, the determination of the proper
scope of judicial inquiry in responding to these concerns. Each of
these issues will be addressed below.
III. WHYJUDICIAL CERTIFICATION OF EXTRADITABILITY IN IN RE
EXTRADITION OFLUI KIN-HONG WAS IMPROPER

Hong Kong's Contingent Status as Party to the Treaty
United States extradition proceedings require a judicial determination that there exists an enforceable treaty operating between the
requesting country and the requested country. 2 7 Prior to the reversion, extradition to Hong Kong was accomplished through Article
II(1) of the Treaty, which provides that the Treaty shall apply to "any
A.

privacy, and worker rights. Some restrictions remained on freedom of movement. In
many cases, the judicial system denies criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and
due process because authorities attach higher priority to maintaining public order
and suppressing political opposition than to enforcing legal norms.
Id. at 617. The Report stated the following regarding the PRC's manner of conducting trial:
Officials often ignore the due process provisions of the law and of the Constitution.
Both before and after trial, authorities subject prisoners to severe psychological pressure to confess. Defendants who fail to "show the right attitude" by confessing their
crimes are typically sentenced more harshly. Criminal trials remain essentially sentencing hearings, despite official denials. Confessions without corroborating evidence
are insufficient for a conviction under law, but coerced confessions are frequently introduced into evidence.
Id. at 621. The introductory statements in the Hong Kong section of Human Rights Watch's
1997 annual report predicted:
As [1996] drew to a close, the chances that Hong Kong's autonomy would be maintained after the July 1, 1997 return to Chinese sovereignty seemed slim. The "one
country two systems" formula for the [HKSAR] was already being systematically
eroded, at least in the area of civil liberties, and the Chinese government seemed intent on repealing provisions of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights, dissolving the elected Legislative Council (Legco), undercutting the independence of the judicial system and
the Executive, and curbing freedom of expression and assembly.
HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1997, at 156 (1996).
126. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1204 (D. Mass.),rev'd, 83 F.3d 523
(1st Cir. 1996); see also Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1491, 1491 (1997) (Breyer, J.
dissenting); United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 121 (1997) (Stahl,J., dissenting), stay
denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
127. See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 941 (explaining role of Judiciary in conducting extradition
proceeding, which includes determining "whether the United States and the requesting country are parties to a valid extradition treaty," and "whether the offenses with which the relator is
charged are extraditable under the treaty").
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territory for the international relations of which the United Kingdom
is responsible and to which the Treaty... [has] been extended."'28 It
is undisputed that the United States would lack proper authority under the Treaty to extradite relators such as Lui to the HKSAR, now a
region of the PRCG.2 This prompted the court in Lui land the courts
hearing Lui's appeal to consider the following question: for the purposes of extradition from the United States to Hong Kong, at what
point would Hong Kong cease to be a constructive.. party to the
Treaty? 3'
Despite the fact that individuals extradited to Hong Kong before it
reverted to the PRC might not be tried or punished until after the
reversion, the court in Lui I cited three reasons in support of its holding that the Treaty remained enforceable until the reversion. First,
the court claimed that the failure of the Secretary of State to terminate the Treaty in accordance with Article II(1) was indicative of the
Executive's intent to continue a treaty relationship with the
HKSAR 13 2 Second, the court relied on the Policy Act, which states
that treaties shall remain in effect "until terminated in accordance
with law,"'33 as evidence of Congress' desire that the Treaty remain in
force. 3 ' Finally, the court determined "that the Senate was satisfied
that the means available to the Secretary of State for dealing with the
reversion situation were entirely satisfactory" because the Supplementary Treaty lacked language regarding the reversion, or the possibility that persons extradited to Hong Kong may serve their sentences beyond the reversion period. 35

128. Treaty, supra note 7, art. II(1).
129. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining that United States cannot
grant foreign extradition requests in absence of extradition treaty, and afterJuly 1, 1997, no
extradition treaty will exist between United States and Hong Kong).

130. "Constructive" has been defined as, "[tihat which is established by the mind of the law

in its act of construingfacts,conduct, circumstances, or instruments." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY
313 (6th ed. 1990); see also infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text (offering argument that
Hong Kong will cease to be party to Treaty when it can no longer meaningfully assure trial and
sentencing under existing Hong Kong law).
131. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing times at which Hong Kong's
status as party to Treaty ceases constructively and officially).
132. See Lui, 939 F. Supp. at 960. The court suggested three ways in which the Secretary of
State could exercise discretion not to extradite: "by giving six months' notice 'through the diplomatic channel,' pursuant to Article XVI(4) ...by giving six months' notice of termination of
the Treaty only as it applies to Hong Kong, pursuant to Article 11(2) ...or simply by refusing to
extradite [pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3186] ...leaving the Treaty entirely intact." Id.
133. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, § 201 (b), 106 Stat.
1448, 1452 (codified in part in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
134. Lui I,939 F. Supp. at 961.
135. See id.
at 961; see also infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the particularized intent for which Supplementary Treaty was enacted, which did not include any facet of
Hong Kong's reversion).
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Notwithstanding the strength or veracity of these claims, none has
a direct bearing on whether there exists a legally enforceable treaty;
they are merely indicative of executive and legislative intent suggesting that the Treaty remain in force. 3 6 A more thorough and searching legal analysis, relying upon the Treaty language itself, would have
led the court to conclude that the Treaty was unenforceable in light
of the circumstances that confronted Lui.
Article II(1) of the Treaty, when interpreted in accordance with
the definition of extradition in Terlinden,137 compels the conclusion
that a Hong Kong extradition request pursuant to the Treaty cannot
be honored unless either the United Kingdom or Hong Kong is responsible for trial, sentencing, and punishment of the relator." Although the courts in Oen Yin-Choy and Cheng Na-Yuet limited the
scope of Terlinden to exclude incarceration as part of the extradition
process for which the demanding nation must be responsible, neither case explicitly excludes trial or sentencing. 9 As time passed it
became increasingly probable that Hong Kong's allegiance to the
United Kingdom would expire prior to the commencement and conclusion of Lui's trial. 4 Because Lui's trial will take place under the
sovereignty of a state other than the United Kingdom, it is certain
that the United Kingdom will not exhibit the requisite responsibility
as prescribed in Article II(1)."' Lacking this responsibility as a nation
"competent to try and punish" Lui in accordance with Terlinden, the
court should have declined issuing a certification of extraditability on
grounds that Hong Kong no longer fell within the scope of the
136. See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 960 (claiming that failure of Secretary of State to terminate
Treaty was indicative of the Executive's "desire" to maintain treaty relationship with Hong
Kong); see also supranotes 110-26 and accompanying text (outlining broad United States policy
considerations contained within Policy Act that weigh in favor of Treaty remaining in force).
137. SeeTerlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) (defining extradition as"surrender by
one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own
territory and within territorial jurisdiction of another, which, being competent to try and to
punish him, demands his surrender").
138. For the definition provided, see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
139. See supranote 100 and accompanying text (explaining courts' interpretations of Trrlinden in ten Yin-Choy and ChengNa-Yuet). Although both courts relied upon the Terlinden definition, neither court, in their respective discussions of Terlinden's application, explained how or
why "incarceration" falls beyond the scope of "punishment," a duty explicitly stated within the
definition as part of the requesting nation's responsibility. See Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289; Oen
Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1988); Chen Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F.
Supp. 988, 992 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
140. SeeLui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (D. Mass.) (stating that"the
likely delay in finalizing the extradition process is a particularly compelling circumstance, given
the reality that the [Extradition] Treaty terminates in fourteen months"), rev'd, 83 F.3d 523
(1st Cir. 1996). Chief Judge Tauro reiterated this point in his decision granting Lui KinHong's petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp.
1280, 1284-86 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (lst Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
141. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. II(1).
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Treaty, pursuant to Article II(1) .12
Although the date upon which Hong Kong's status as an actual
party to the Treaty expired onJune 30, 1997,' the foregoing analysis
demonstrates that expiration constructively occurred at that moment
when Hong Kong could no longer guarantee that Lui would be tried
A U.S. court conducting
and sentenced under its existing laws.'
implicitly be forced to
would
status
Kong's
Hong
of
an
analysis
such
consider the efficiency and speed of Hong Kong's judicial processes.' Although such an analysis could not be employed to predict
with complete certainty whether Lui's trial and sentencing would
conclude prior to July 1, 1997, the court in Lui I declined to recognize that the rapid approach of the reversion date rendered this possibility all but unattainable. The court in Lui II did not hesitate to
suggest that Lui would not be tried under existing Hong Kong law.'4 6
Under these circumstances, a certification of extraditability in the
first instance should not have issued.
B.

The Prohibitionof Constructive "Re-extradition"to the
People's Republic of China

The court in Lui I indicated that even if Lui were tried under the
sovereignty of the PRC, it would not preclude judicial certification of
his extraditability.' 47 The court provided two mutually exclusive lines
of reasoning in support of this contention. First, the court viewed
Lui's specialty argument as highly analogous to those raised in Tang
Yee-Chun, Oen Yin-Choy, and ChengNa-Yuet, which it had previously de142. See Terlinden, 184 U.S. at 289 (defining extradition as one nation's surrender of individual accused or convicted of crime to territorial jurisdiction of another nation seeking to try
or punish that individual).
143. SeeTreaty, supra note 7, art. 11(1); see also Lui Kin-Hong, 926 F. Supp. at 1189 (holding
that any person held pursuant to an extradition request from Hong Kong in the United States
after the date of the reversion will have to be released).
144. Hypothetically, if the United Kingdom did concede that Lui's trial or sentencing
would not take place prior to July 1, 1997, a court interpreting Terlinden consonant with the
preceding analysis would no longer have reason to keep Lui incarcerated. Furthermore, it is
not stated in the Treaty whether the Judiciary or the Executive Branch would receive such a
guarantee or assurance from the United Kingdom that Lui would be tried and sentenced prior
to the reversion. See Treaty, supra note 7. The court that certified Lui's extraditability speculated that assurances of this type would "very likely" be provided to the Executive branch, and
further, that the Secretary of State would retain sole discretion to decide whether such assurances were satisfactory. See In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 961 (D. Mass.
1996), petitionfor habeas corpusgranted sub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280
(D. Mass.), rev'd 110 F.3d 103 (lst Cir. 1997), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
145. This would be true only if the United Kingdom did not provide assurances relating to
Lui Kin-Hong's trial and sentencing.
146. See supranote 140 and accompanying text.
147. See Lui , 939 F. Supp. at 962 (rejecting Lui's argument that the "impending reversion
renders him unextraditable"). The court did not purport to decide whether the reversion
should preclude Executive determination of extraditability. See id.
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termined to be meritless." 8 Second, the court considered specialty
arguments to be political and not judicial in nature, and thus appropriate for the consideration by the Secretary of State, not federal
judges.'49

The court deemed Lui's attempt to distinguish Tang Yee-Chun, Oen
Yin-Choy, and Cheng Na-Yuet "immaterial" because the relators in
those cases, like Lui, faced the prospect of continued incarceration in
the post-reversion period. 50 The court's unwillingness to distinguish
"incarceration" from "trial" or "sentencing" sheds light on the
strained logic that led the court to declare Tang Yee-Chun, Oen YinChoy, and Cheng Na-Yuet "directly on point."'5 ' The petitioner's specialty argument in Tang Yee-Chun rested on the notion that extradition in light of the reversion constituted a de facto extradition to the
PRC, a prima facie violation of Article XII. The court responded by
deferring judgment to the Secretary of State.'
By simply refining
this argument to implicate possible incarceration in the post reversion period, the petitioners in Oen Yin-Choy and Cheng Na-Yuet successfully persuaded their respective courts to consider the issue
proper
for adjudication and decline to leave it for the Secretary of
State. 5
en Yin-Choy and Cheng Na-Yuet were closer in time to Lui's
proceedings, and closer to the reversion date than Tang Yee-Chun.54
Therefore, it is unclear why the court in Lui I declined to hear the
issue.'95
148. See id. at 957.
149. See id. at 958. The court stated that"when the sovereignty of a treaty partner changes,
the decision to honor a request for extradition 'is in its nature political and not judicial,' and
hence should be decided by the 'political department.'" Id. (quoting Terlinden v. Ames, 184
U.S. 270, 288 (1902)).
150. Id. at 957.
151. Of the three cases that the court declared "directly on point," Cheng Na-Yuet was decided last, on March 27, 1990. See Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F. Supp. 988, 992 (S.D. Fla.
1990). Given the considerable time lapse between the reversion date and these three proceedings, it was extremely unlikely that Petitioners Cheng, Oen, or Tang would have been tried or
sentenced under the laws of the PRC. Evidence of this can be seen in that neither Cheng, Oen,
nor Tang argued that they might have been subjected to trial or sentencing in the HKSAR. See
Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F.2d 1400, 1403-04 (9th Cir. 1988); Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp.
at 992-94; In re Extradition of Tang, 674 F. Supp. 1058, 1068-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Conversely,
this is a central feature of Lui's argument. See Lui I, 939 F. Supp. at 957. These factual differences render the three cases used by the court in Lui I inapplicable to Lui, who awaited a final
decision on his extraditability mere weeks from the reversion date.
152. See supranotes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing Tang's specialty argument).
153. See Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1400 (deciding petitioner's specialty concerns on merits);
Cheng Na-Yuet, 734 F. Supp. at 992-94 (deciding petitioner's specialty concerns on merits);
Tang, 674 F. Supp. at 1068-69 (deferringjudgment on issue of specialty to Secretary of State).
154. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (explaining that petitioners in Oen YinChoy and ChengNa-Yuet raised incarceration as an issue, while Tang did not).
155. One possible reason that may have motivated the court was to "avoid the potential embarrassment to the United States Government of not being able to produce someone who has
been ordered to be extradited." Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (D.
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Upon his extradition to Hong Kong, Article XII of the Treaty enjoined Hong Kong authorities from surrendering Lui to a third state
for the purposes of trial and punishment. 56 Yet this is exactly what
Lui faced upon his extradition. The HKSAR is clearly a third state
within the terms of the Treaty, 57 and the United Kingdom's relinquishment of control over Lui to the HKSAR is nothing short of a
constructive delivery. 8 In addition, because judicial proceedings
against Lui were neither commenced nor concluded prior to the reversion, any guarantees offered by the United Kingdom that the
HKSAR or the PRC would not charge Lui with additional offenses or
apply to him additional penalties would have lacked all sufficiency
and authority.' 9 Extradition of Lui for trial in the HKSAR was tantamount to a United States extradition to Hong Kong for the purpose of re-extradition by the requesting party to a third state because
the HKSAR did not continue as a territory of the United Kingdom)' °
Furthermore, the reversion renders ineffective the United Kingdom's
ability to honor the remaining part of the specialty provision, which
provides that relators will not face prior charges other than those for
which they were extradited. 6' Each part of Article XII thus violated,
the request for Lui's extradition should have been refused.' 62

Mass.), revd, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996).
156. Specifically, Article XII prohibits extradition to a "third State." Treaty, supra note 6,
art. XII(1). Extradition has been defined previously as "surrender by one nation to another...
to try and punish" the relator. SeeTerlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
157. Article II of the Treaty actually puts forth two requirements for its extension to a territory. SeeTreaty, supra note 7, art. II(1)(a). First, it must be a territory"for the international
relations of which the United Kingdom is responsible," and second, the territory must be "one
to which the Treaty shall have been extended by agreement between the Contracting parties
embodied in an exchange of Notes." Id. The United Kingdom is clearly no longer responsible
for Hong Kong. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 45, art. 1. In addition, the HKSAR is not
listed as a territory in the Exchange of Notes enumerating the specific territories to which the
United Kingdom extended the Treaty. See Treaty, supra note 7, art. 11(1) (a) (recognizing application to Hong Kong through Exchange of Notes, Oct. 21, 1976). Because it meets neither
of these requirements, the HKSAR is clearly to be a "third State" as provided in Article XII.
158. Upon the PRC's resumption of sovereignty, the judicial power of Hong Kong became
vested in courts of the HKSAR. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 45, Annex I, art. III. Thus,
because Lui was under the control of the Hong Kong judicial system at midnight on June 30,
1997, pursuant to the terms Joint Declaration, he was "delivered" from the authority of Hong
Kong, to the authority of the HKSAR, an "inalienable part" of the People's Republic of China.
See id.art. 1, Annex I, art. III.
159. Set Lui Kin-Hong, 926 F. Supp. at 1204 (noting congressional concern regarding the
potential treatment of relators extradited to Hong Kong who may still be incarcerated beyond
the reversion).
160. See id. at 1182 (discussing dependence of Hong Kong's power to extradite on its colonial relationship to United Kingdom).
161. Within the circumstances of Lui's proceedings, this is in violation of United States law
as it permits extradition to a country with which the United States does not have an treaty. See
18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1994).
162. SeeTreaty, supranote 7, art. XII.
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The Reversion's Effect on SecuringAssurancesAgainst
CapitalPunishment

In concert with the alleged violation of Article XII's specialty provision, Lui contended that he would be subject to the death penalty
under PRC law in violation of the Article IV capital offense exception.163 This presents two important questions: first, whether Lui's
claim warns of a legitimate violation of Article IV, and second, in
what party-Hong Kong, the HKSAR, the United Kingdom, or the
PRC-the Treaty vested the authority to issue assurances regarding
Lui's treatment.
The court addressed Lui's Article IV argument in a footnote,
claiming that it merited a response similar to that accorded Lui's
specialty argument.'64 The court reasoned that Tang Yee-Chun, Oen
Yin-Choy, and Cheng Na-Yuet supported the notion that extradition of
capital crime defendants did not violate Article IV, and concluded
that claims implicating Article IV, like specialty claims, should be
heard by the Secretary of State.'65
The court's cursory analysis failed to recognize that the circumstances surrounding the reversion defeat the possibility for Lui to obtain assurances from any party, regardless of whether they are a party
bound by the Treaty.'6 It is assuredly within the PRC's power to apply the death penalty to Lui's case as trial or sentencing shall take
place after the reversion. 67 Thus, had the United States received assurances from Hong Kong or the United Kingdom that Lui would
not be subject to the death penalty, such assurances would have carried little, if any, weight as they would have been effective only until
June 30, 1997.26 Assurances could have been obtained from the PRC
163. See In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 956, n.22 (D. Mass. 1996),petition for habeas corpus granted sub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D.
Mass.), rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.),stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997). Lui speculated that"he
might face [the death penalty] under Chinese law given the absence of assurances that specialty
protection will be honored." Id.
164. See id.
165. See id. These were the two arguments used by the court to defeat Lui's specialty claims,
see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of Lui's specialty arguments in greater detail).
166. Upon the reversion, Hong Kong ceased to be a party to the Treaty, and the authority
of the United'States to extradite individuals to Hong Kong was extinguished completely. See
Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir.
1996); see alsoTreaty, supra note 7, at 132-34 (lacking terms that might extend the Treaty to the
HKSAR).
167. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (suggesting that if China does not formally adopt existing treaty between United States and United Kingdom, China will not be
bound by any international agreements protecting Lui from capital punishment).
168. SeeJoint Declaration, supra note 45, art. 1 (explaining that exercise of United Kingdom's control over area will cease completely upon reversion date).
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on its own behalf, or on behalf of the future HKSAR; however, if such
assurances been sought, the communication would be tantamount to
an admission by the United States that it was either extraditing Lui to
a country with which the United States did not have a treaty, or extraditing him to Hong Kong with full knowledge that he would be
subject to Chinese sovereignty in violation of established U.S. extradition law'o' and specialty rights under the Treaty. 70 Therefore, considering the relative impossibility of Lui obtaining any such assurances, he lacked the protection afforded under Article IV.
Article IV grants the requested country discretion to deny extradition if assurances of just treatment are not provided or are inadequate; 7 ' Article IV does not state, however, that the requested country must obtain assurances in order to extradite if the relator could
face death.'2 Furthermore, Article IV grants the power to the requested country, not the relator, to ask for such assurances.'7 Thus,
it is clear that the mere absence of assurances does not violate Article
IV, even if the relator might benefit from them. This argument may
diminish the merit of Lui's claims, but it is distinguishable from the
circumstance where the requesting party deprives the requested party
its right to demand assurances, as was the case throughout Lui's proceedings.' 74 Although this may not be a per se violation of Article
IVI'75 there exists plausible legal grounds for a court sensitive to these

concerns to deny extradition. 7 6
D. The Rule on Non-Inquily, JudicialDeference, and the Needfor
Senate Ratiflcation
In determining whether the Secretary of State should consider
Lui's reversion defenses, 7 the court relied exclusively on the judi169. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (establishing that U.S. law allows international extradition only pursuant to an enforceable extradition treaty).
170. See Treaty, supranote 7, art. IV (permitting requested country to deny extradition request if requesting country does not provide adequate assurances ofjust treatment).
171. See id.
172. See id. Article IV states explicitly that a requested country "may" request assurances.
See id.
173. Se id.
174. Seesupranotes 57-60 and accompanying text.
175. Based on the terms of the Article IV, a per se violation would likely be a demand by the
requested country for assurances followed by a failure to provide them. See Treaty, supra note
7, art. IV.
176. Some courts have displayed this sensitivity. See, e.g., Cheng Na-Yuet v. Hueston, 734 F.
Supp. 988, 994 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("The Court is not as convinced as the government that Petitioner's claim that there exists a possibility that she will receive the death penalty for her crime
in Hong Kong sometime after 1997 pushes the notion of what is 'possible' to the limits.'"
(quoting United States Reply Memorandum to Petitioner's Legal Brief)).
177. See In reExtradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D. Mass. 1996),petitionfor
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cially-created doctrine known as "the rule of non-inquiry. 178 Under
this rule, evidence introduced regarding the overall unfairness of the
requesting country's judicial system is precluded based on the presumption that "countries with which the United States has entered
into extradition treaties will treat those extraditions under the treaty
fairly."' 79 It is undeniable that upon the Senate's ratification of the
Treaty and Supplementary Treaty, the rule would preclude judicial
inquiry into the treatment of relators by the United Kingdom and the
territories for which it is responsible,' except for those cases involving political crimes. 8' For those countries with which the United
States is a treaty partner, the rule has clear and well reasoned authority and purpose. For those countries with which the United States
has yet to commence or even conclude treaty commitments (such as
habeascorpus grantedsub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.), rvtd,
110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
178. See id. (finding that courts must, in discharging statutory responsibility to determine
extraditability, consider requesting country's motive in seeking extradition, requesting country's willingness and ability to protect the accused, and type of treatment to which requesting
country might subject accused if extradition is permitted). The rule of non-inquiry recognizes
that some aspects of extradition are legal and call upon the Judiciary Branch, while other aspects are political in nature and require the involvement of the Executive Branch. See id. For
commentary and discussion analyzing the interpretation of the rule of non-inquiry in federal
courts, see Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, The Constitution and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in
InternationalExtraditionProceedings,76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991).
179. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911) (stating that court is bound by existence of extradition treaty to assume that lower court's trial was fair); see also Scharf, supra note
4, at 268 n.46 (providing extensive listing of instances in United States jurisprudence where
courts have upheld rule of non-inquiry).
180. See Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512 (holding that courts are bound by existence of extradition treaty to assure fair trial).
181. Under what is often referred to as the "political offense exception" the courts can refuse to extradite a relator who has committed an offense of a "political character." See Scharf,
supra note 4, at 257 n.3. Article 3 of Supplementary Treaty currently governs the application of
the political offense exception between the United States and the United Kingdom. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3. Article 3 provides that:
[E]xtradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to a competent judicial
authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in
fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or, that he would, if surrendered be prejudiced at his trial or
punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race nationality, or political opinions.
Id. art. 3(a) (emphasis added). Article 3(a), however, is limited to an enumerated list of offenses contained within Article 1 that are not regarded as political crimes, including (but not
limited to) murder, manslaughter, assault causing grievous bodily harm, kidnapping, abduction, taking a hostage, and offenses using a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel
bomb, or any incendiary device. Id. art. 1; see also In re Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137,
1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (interpreting Article 3(a) broadly to permit inquiry into various aspects
of criminal justice system, including searches, seizures, arrests, detentions, interrogations, and
conditions of confinement as well as the proceedings at person's trial); Lui in-Hong v. United
States, 957 F. Supp. 1280, 1289 (D. Mass.) (recognizing political offense exception as"powerful
evidence that the Senate wished the Treaty to apply only to relators who could be tried and
punished by a signatory sovereign whose credentials and trust had been weighed and judged by
the United States"), rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
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however, application of the rule becomes
the PRC or the HKSAR),
2
far more dubious.'1

The two-part process of United States extradition outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 3184 recognizes the special abilities and sensitivities within
each branch of government to respond to an extradition request in a
manner that best accommodates competing interests.'83 These interests are not limited to those of the treaty signatories, related to foreign policy and affairs, but include the interests of the relator, who is
afforded protection through the Executive's right to make and terminate treaties, and the Senate's right of ratification.'8 4 The fact that
the United States honors only those requests for extradition supported by an enforceable treaty suggests that the rule of non-inquiry
should not be applied in Lui's case.'85
Lui argued that judicial deference is owed to the Secretary of State
only when the Senate has ratified a treaty. ' 8 He augmented this arwith the
conflict
gument with the claim that his extradition would
'87
.
•
In recircumstances.
present
under
branches
will of the political
treaty
persponse, the court held that Lui failed to recognize that the
tinent to his proceedings was in fact ratified by the Senate, and that
any further appeal for protection beyond that provided by the Senate's ratification must be made to the Secretary of State88 The court
cited three cases in which judgment of extraditability was deferred to
the Secretary of State to address the changing sovereignty of a treaty

182. On December 20, 1996, the United States signed an extradition treaty with the government of the nascent HKSAR, which provides for reciprocal post-reversion extradition. See
United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 109 (Ist Cir.),stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
The treaty was ratified by the Senate in early November 1997. See Simon Beck, U.S. Senate Ratifie SAR Extradition Treaty, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 17, 1997, at 6. The treaty was ratified
with the caveat that relators extradited to the HKSAR could not be subsequently transferred to
the Chinese mainland without the consent of the relator. See id. In addition, the Senate ordered the State Department to produce a report one year from the date the treaty went into
effect on the accord's progress, the status of relators extradited to the HKSAR, and the state of
the HKSAR'sjudicial system. See id.
183. See supranote 180 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts' previous responses to extradition requests).
184. See id.
185. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 7-9 (1936) (holding that statute or treaty
must counter power to extradite); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (stating
that principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty); United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-414 (1886) (noting that treaties regulate extradition);see
also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
186. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (indicating that ratification of treaties is constitutional
right conferred upon Senate).
187. See In reExtradition of Lui Kin-Hong, 939 F. Supp. 934, 959-60 (D. Mass. 1996),petition
for habeas corpus granted sub nom. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Mass.),
rev'd, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997) (arguing that treaty ratification
process by Senate reflects confidence in legal system of treaty partner).
188. See id. at 959-60.
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partner. 9 In each of these cases, the United States was entertaining
extradition requests from the successor state on behalf of the state
with which the United States had a treaty. These requests were also
made subsequent to the transfer of sovereignty. In present terms,
this would translate to the PRC, not Hong Kong, requesting the extradition of Lui after theJuly 1, 1997, reversion date. Assurances under this scenario could be forwarded to the Secretary of State by the
PRC, the sovereign conducting the trial, sentencing, and punishment.' " The facts of Lui Iprecluded the possibility of assurances be-

ing obtained by the Secretary of State on Lui's behalf,"" which distinguishes it clearly from these earlier cases. This strengthens the
argument that the rule of non-inquiry should not be applied, because
the only protection that Lui could have sought against the political
insensitivity of the Executive rested solely within the courts.
Had the court in Lui I abandoned the rule, it is debatable whether
or not the facts presented by the reversion would have prompted a
denial of extraditability9 2 Regardless, this determination must follow
an analysis of the propriety of the court's decision not to apply the
rule. In certain extradition cases between the United States and the
United Kingdom in which the efficacy of the Executive to evaluate
assurances is at question, the Supplementary Treaty explicitly permits
the court to inquire into the fairness of the foreign judicial system.' 9
189. SeeTerlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); United States v. Tuttle (In reExtradition of
Tuttle), 966 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1992);In re Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 927 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No.
13,887). Terlinden and Thomas involved relators challenging extradition from the United States
to the newly formed Empire of Germany, on the grounds that existing treaties with the Kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria, respectively, ceased to be enforceable upon their absorption into
the new German Empire; the requests specifically rose from authorities of the Empire of Germany, and not from within the prior Kingdoms. See Terlinden, 184 U.S. 270 at 273, 282; Thomas,
23 F. Cas. at 928, 930. Tuttle concerned a relator who challenged his extradition from the
United States to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, which gained its independence from the
United Kingdom in 1973, see Tutle, 966 F.2d at 1317. The operable treaty existed between the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the request was presented by the authorities for
the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. See id.
190. See supranotes 167-72 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of obtaining assurances in Lui's case).
191. See supranotes 169-71 and accompanying text.
192. The First Circuit and Magistrate Judge Karol seemed unsympathetic to Lui's concerns
regarding the reversion; ChiefJudge Tauro, however, would likely have denied certifying Lui's
extradition, had he heard Lui's case in the first instance. Compare Lui Kin-Hong v. United
States, 83 F.3d 523, 525 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that reversion with respect to Lui's extradition
did not constitute a special circumstance), and Lui 1, 939 F. Supp. at 941 (D. Mass. 1996)
(certifying Lui's extraditability despite arguments detailing potentially inhumane treatment of
relator if extradited), with Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (D. Mass.)
(intimating Lui's probable success on appeal in stating there is "substantial likelihood" that his
extradition will not take place), rev'd, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996). See Lui Kin-Hong v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d
103 (lst Cir.) (Stahl,J., dissenting), stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
193. See Supplementary Treaty, supranote 7, art. 3(a); see alsoIn re Extradition of Smyth, 863
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This inquiry is encouraged despite the Senate's ratification expressing confidence in the United Kingdom's legal system. 9 4 Lui faced a
situation devoid of the possibility of both receiving assurances and a
legislative vote of confidence in the legal system that will try, sentence
and punish him. Therefore, policy inherent within the terms of the
Treaty does not preclude, but rather promotes judicial departure
from the rule of non-inquiry. To the extent that this may be offset by
official sources of policy claiming that U.S. law should continue in
the HKSAR as it has prevousy,' such claims should not function to
relieve the courts from conducting an analysis guided by the protections traditionally afforded any relator in response to an extradition
request.
CONCLUSION

In re Extradition of Lui Kin-Hong is a case in which existing law and
processes failed to respond adequately under the burden of extraordinary circumstance." One need look only so far as the purposes
underlying our rather intricate extradition processes reflected in the
F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (abandoning rule of non-inquiry and denying request for
certification of extraditability after conducting extensive inquiry regarding the treatment that
individual may receive if extradited); Inre Extradition of Howard, 791 F. Supp. 31, 35 (D. Mass.
1992) (affirming lower court's certification of extraditability after determining that individual
had not met burden of showing sufficient prejudice would exist at his foreign trial if extradited); In reExtradition of McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (reversing lower
court's certification of extraditability on grounds that implicated issues concerning fairness of
requesting country's foreign judicial system); supra note 182 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of Article 3(a) on the political offense exception).
194. The signing of the Supplementary Treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom was a direct response to three "recent cases [in which] the federal courts... denied
requests by the United Kingdom for the extradition of the Provisional Irish Republican Army
[(IRA)] accused or convicted of committing acts of violence on the grounds that offenses were
political." Scharf, supra note 4, at 262 (citing Supplementary Treaty, U.S.-U.K., S. EXEC. REP.
No. 17, 99th Cong., at 2 (1986)). The original version of the Supplementary Treaty would have
almost completely abolished the political offense exception. Congress adopted Article 3(a),
and in particular the language that allows appeal to a "competentjudicial authority," as a compromise to "mollify critics who questioned the fairness" of the United Kingdom's judicial system in Northern Ireland. See id. at 264. The legislative history indicates that the adoption of
Article 3(a) was motivated in part to "circumvent an uncooperative executive," and to convey to
the Judiciary the Senate's overall feeling that "the standard of justice in Northern Ireland is
unacceptable ... until [it is] changed to reflect basic safeguards for the individual." Id. at 267.
Thus, the Lui Icourt's inference that the Supplemental Treaty's failure to address the reversion
or its effects on those extradited and sentenced evinced the Senate's confidence in the Secretary of State to exercise Executive discretion, see Lui 1, 939 F. Supp. at 961, may not be entirely
well-founded.
195. See Lui , 939 F. Supp. at 960 (maintaining that Policy Act is a "powerful statement by
Congress that the Treaty shall remain in effect beyond reversion"); see also supra notes 106-24
and accompanying text (discussing Policy Act, and its impact on Lui 1).
196. Novel as the circumstances facing the court in Lui I may have been, Magistrate Judge
Margolis of the United States District Court of Connecticut rendered a decision dealing with
facts nearly identical to Lui I, 968 F. Supp. 791 (1997). In certifying the extraditability of Cheung, the court relied extensively on the decision of the First Circuit in Lui lII.
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delicate balance of authority conferred to both our Executive and
Judiciary and the well-established rule from Terlinden and its progeny,
to see that Lui should not have been extradited. At the time of Lui's
extradition, there did not exist an enforceable treaty with the sovereign that would try and punish him; moreover, the courts presiding
over Lui were without any expression from the U.S. Senate regarding
its level of confidence in the PRC's legal processes. Denial of Lui's
extradition would have required neither a broad reading of applicable case law, nor a departure from the procedural mandates in 18
U.S.C. § 3184 et seq. To suggest that the courts responsible for Lui's
certification of extraditability improperly availed themselves to the
pervasive U.S. political climate regarding United States-PRC relations could be supported by nothing more than mere speculation.
This notwithstanding, the following conclusion remains incontrovertible. The issues identified in this Note associated with theJudiciary's seemingly enthusiastic deference to the Executive, apparent
throughout Lui's proceedings, should serve to instruct future courts
that the integrity of the judicial power in an extradition matter must
be preserved. Equally important, it remains critical that our courts
exercise utmost caution when deciding to embrace legal formalism at
the expense of protections embedded in our law's logical and persuasive purposes.

